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CHAPTER I 
The Language of Metaphor 
Metaphorical theories may be divided into literal and non-literal 
theories. The division between literal and non-literal theories is 
based on three main points of disagreement in establishing a theory of 
metaphor. These points are (1) similarity vs. difference within the 
metaphor, (2) non-absurdity vs. absurdity of the metaphor, and (3) its 
translatability vs. its non-translatability. These points stem from 
Aristotle's discussion of metaphor, for he raised two main questions 
about metaphor that continue to occupy modern metaphorical theorists. 
These two ideas are first that a metaphor has two terms related through 
"similarity in dissimilars" and second, that this relationship is ana-
logical or proportional. He states that "Metaphors must be drawn 
from things that are related to the original thing, and yet not 
obviously so related--just as in philosophy also an acute mind will per-
ceive resemblances even in things far apart." (3:191) and that 
" ..• a good metaphor implies an intuitive perception of the similarity 
in dissimilars." (3:255) Thus a metaphor, according to Aristotle, has 
two terms that are in some ways similar to each other and this similar-
ity presents us with an analogical or proportional relationship through 
which we may logically understand the completed metaphor. 
Aristotle's "similarity in dissimilars" remains with us as the 
opposition of similarity vs. difference, and his belief that the rela-
tionship is analogical or proportional remains with us as the opposition 
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of non-absurdity vs. absurdity. These differences taken together consti-
tute the third opposition in modern metaphorical theories: translat-
ability vs. non-translatability. 
The literalists generally emphasize the similarity between the two 
terms of a metaphor and because they believe this similarity is based 
on logic they also believe the combination of the terms that creates 
the completed metaphor is not absurd. That is, there is a relation-
ship between the terms on the semantic level. As such, we can reduce 
the similarity to a logical analogy or proposition and this analogy or 
proposition may in turn be translated into a series of prose statements 
that will be equivalent to the original metaphor. 
The non-literalists, on the other hand, emphasize the difference 
between the two terms of a metaphor, and because of this difference 
they maintain that there is an inherent absurdity in the combination of 
these terms. That is, they believe that there is no relationship be-
tween the terms on the semantic level. Therefore they also believe 
that we cannot reduce the completed metaphor to a logical analogy or 
proposition. The completed metaphor is then not the kind of statement 
that can be translated into a series of prose statements that will be 
equivalent to the original metaphor. The non-literal theory estab-
lishes metaphor as a means of creating and attaining insight through an 
imaginative use of language. It is consistent with the manner in which 
new language forms and insights develop and are gradually absorbed into 
a standard language. The questions that we will be dealing with through-
out this paper concern the various components of metaphor and the rela-
tionships between these components in respect to the three main points 
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of difference just mentioned. I will cover these points in more detail 
:1.n the following chapter. The non-literal theory of metaphor will be 
correlated with a general theory of language and both of these theories 
will correspond with the manner in which man encounters the universe 
and acquires knowledge. 
The proliferation of terms by the different theorists has reached 
a point that a unified understanding of the various positions is diffi-
cult to achieve. But even though the terms they use are different, dif-
ferent theorists are usually talking about the same kinds of things, so 
for the sake of clarity I will state most of their ideas in a standard 
-
terminology. This may result in a slight blurring of the exactness of 
each writer's ideas, but it will enable us to achieve a more unified 
view of how each writer's ideas are related to other writers' ideas. 
In 1936 I. A. Richards introduced the terms tenor and vehicle to 
distinguish the two terms of a metaphor. (110:96-97) According to 
Richard's explanation, the tenor of a metaphor is the idea being ex-
pressed or the subject of the comparison, while the vehicle of the 
metaphor is the :irnage by which this idea is conveyed or the subject 
conmunicated. The tenor and the vehicle interact with each other to 
constitute the completed metaphor. The relationship between the tenor 
and vehicle can vary f'rom the vehicle's being a decoration of the tenor, 
to the tenor being an excuse for introducing the vehicle. Shipley states 
that, "Richards suggests a division of metaphors according as tenor and 
vehicle (A) have a direct resemblance ('the winter of my discontent') 
or (B) are bound by the maker's attitude (one's enemies are rats or 
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gargoyle grotesques)." (119:268) Richards also feels that the differ-
ences in the relationship are as :lmportant as the similarities. We can 
see that Richards has partially adopted Aristotle's idea of "similarity 
in dissimilars" and has added some precision to the two subjects of a 
metaphor by the use of the terms tenor and vehicle. These terms have 
been very valuable, but they only help us a little in understanding a 
metaphor and they do not explain the relationship between the terms. 
Tenor and vehicle are well enough known that they carry their own mean-
ings and in using them it would be difficult to introduce new ideas or 
erase old ideas concerning the nature of the two subjects of a metaphor. 
Therefore, instead of using tenor and vehicle, I will use Max Black's 
less familiar but more descriptive terms, principal subject and sub-
sidiary subject. (16:44) Also, instead of using Aristotle's "similar-
ity" I will use the term resemblance. This will remove any possible 
confusion with the word "simile." 
The various theorists also use the terms denotation, designation, 
connotation, and association in a wide variety of ways. For this paper, 
denotation· will be used to refer to the relationship between the term 
and its referent as a thing. This is a direct and public relation in 
which the term refers to a thing or object. Designation will refer to 
the critical attributes of the category named by the term. Connotation 
will refer to the term's non-critical attributes. Association will re-
fer to the private attributes of the term generated out of the relation-
ship between the user of the term and the term's referents. This is a 
private and personal relationship which does not necessarily have any 
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meaning for anyone but the user or listener of the term. All of these 
terms--denotation, designation, connotation, and association--taken to-
gether constitute the signification of each term being discussed, 
whether it be a single word or a phrase. Signification is the total 
sense of a term at any particular moment for a particular user or 
listener. See figure 1, page 6. 
There is a progression from associations, which are private and 
individual, through connotations to designations, which are public and 
general. In the creation of a metaphor the designative, connotative 
and/or associative values of the two terms are switched. It is rare 
that all of these values would be switched in one metaphor. When the 
more private and individual values are switched, the metaphor is more 
subtle than if the public and general values are switched. As an 
exanple we can use Shakespeare's "All the world is a stage," in which 
there is a crossing of denotations and disignations, from stage to 
world. This metaphor is a seeing the world as a stage on a public and 
general level but undoubtedly for Shakespeare and his audience there is 
also a mixing on the connotative and associative levels. 
Shakespeare's metaphor is quite sinple when taken on the desig-
native level, but if we move to the opposite end of the scale, to a 
predominately associative metaphor, like Blake's 110 Rose thou art 
sick, 1' we are presented with different problems. Exactly what Blake 
means by Rose and sick are part of his personal reactions and all we 
can hope for in being able to understand this metaphor, is that we will 
be able to find statements about the rose and what he means by sick in 
Signification1 Denotation 
, 
Referent 
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., 
Attributes 
I . . . 
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General Individual 
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his other writings. These words, rose and sick, have general and pub-
lic designative and connotative meanings tbat enable us to understand 
the metaphor on these levels, but the metaphorical qualities of Blake's 
statement reside primarily in an associative context, and until this is 
made explicit, the important aspects of the metaphor escape us. Most 
metaphors will cover the range from denotation to association but will 
place emphasis on the designative and connotative aspects of their sub-
jects. If the poet places too much emphasis on the transferring of 
associative values, the metaphor will be so private that few people 
will understand it and if too much emphasis is placed on transferring 
designative values the metaphor will tend to be trite. 
CHAPTER II 
Literalists and Non-literalists Theories of Metaphor 
The literalists view metaphor as essentially a disguised or tele-
scoped simile, an elliptical simile, because they feel there is a basic 
similarity or resemblance between the two terms of a metaphor. They 
hold that a metaphor consists in the presentation of an underlying 
analogy expressed in the similarity between the terms. Metaphor of 
analogy or similarity is basically logical (non-absurd) and can be 
translated into another set of terms. The main difference between a 
metaphor and a simile in this view is that a simile uses the words like 
or as and a metaphor does not. Aristotle, Scott Buchanan, Andrew 
Ushenko, and Richards essentially hold this view. (3:160) They feel 
that metaphors offer no particular problems for explication. The meta-
phors can be reduced to a simile and then through a series of prose 
statements we can derive the same information that is conveyed in the 
metaphor. This view is also held be Hershberger, who believes "that 
metaphor, the distinctive feature of poetry, is fundamentally an ex-
pository, and--in its own way--economic prose usage; that in principle, 
through scientific study of the aesthetic experience, a metaphor is re-
ducible to a multiplicity of integrated prose arguments; ... " (51:433) 
In effect she believes that there is a resemblance between the terms of 
metaphor and that this resemblance is logical. 
According to Black, the literal theory may actually be divided into 
two subgroups: the substitution and comparison views. The substitution 
theorists believe that metaphor can be replaced by, or substituted with, 
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a prose statement. The comparison view maintains that a metaphor con-
sists in the presentation of the underlying analogy or similarity be-
tween the two terms and "holds that the metaphorical statement might be 
replaced by an equivalent literal comparison." (16:35) This means that 
the substitution and comparison views imply each other and both may be 
considered literal theories because they hold that a metaphor may be 
translated into prose statements. For the metaphor to be replaced or 
substituted by another statement is essentially a translating of the 
metaphor into another statement. One of the basic reasons for the 
literalists' acceptance of the translatability of metaphor is their be-
lief that a metaphor points out resemblances that we are already aware 
of prior to the act of relating them in the metaphor. Because we are 
aware of these resemblances, we can express those relationships in other 
terms besides those of the completed metaphor. 
However, a wea.lm.ess in this idea is that it does not take into con-
sideration the fact that the metaphor may create relationships that we 
were not previously aware of. Also, the belief in translatability ig-
nores the fact that all we can translate with any accuracy are the 
designative and possibly some connotative meanings, and even then we 
have a different whole because new and different relationships are 
created when any one element is changed. The majority of the connotat-
ive and almost all of the associative meanings cannot be translated be-
cause they depend upon the individuality of each reader . 
.Another major wea.lm.ess of the literal theorists is that they have 
not brought their views into a general language theory and have not 
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tried to fit their theories into the manner in which man perceives his 
universe and creates language. The only system that they have tried to 
fit metaphor into is that of logic as it is presently understood. The 
literal view makes metaphorical statement just another way of saying 
something and does not account for its uniqueness as a means of acquir-
ing insight and expanding lmowledge. 
The literalists, then, assert that metaphor expresses a similarity 
in the terms that are being related, that the relationship is a logical 
one--that is, is not absurd--and because of the logical similarity be-
tween the terms, the relationship can be translated into a series of 
prose statements. 
There is a connection formed between the literalists and the non-
literalists by Max Rieser. Rieser is like the literalists when he says 
that metaphor is a, " ..• transformation" of the simile. (8:160) This 
would make metaphor basically a simile, and since simile is based on a 
prescribed set of logical corTespondences, a simile would express a 
non-absurd relationship and would be transcribable into a series of 
prose statements. However, Rieser is like the non-literalists in his 
belief that although metaphor is misused language--that is, is not 
literally true--this misuse is valuable. He says that metaphor is an 
expression that has emotive impact but no meaning. A statement or 
phrase that can be tested is one that has meaning; a statement or phrase 
that cannot be tested cannot be said to have meaning. There is no way 
of testing metaphors, and Rieser denies meaning to metaphor. He denies 
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meaning because, " .•. the link (between the two subjects of the metaphor) 
is not factual but emotional," (8: 160) .·and "poetic comparison is not a 
proposition at all." (8:160) 
Rieser's idea that the resemblance between the terms of a metaphor 
is an emotional one, means that the crucial aspects of metaphor do not 
reside in any rational or logical system. Since it creates relation-
ships that do not re:side in a logical system, metaphor is literally abi;, 
surd. Understanding a metaphor is therefore a matter of emotional con-
formity, not of rationality, and of putting one's self in tune with the 
emotions of the poet. Rieser feels that, whenever an object has 
acquired an emotional value for the poet, his mind will seek an object 
of similar emotional value as 'explanation'." (111:216) This feeling 
does not explain why a particular poet's mind creates metaphors of the 
type that it does, but just says that for any particular poet, the meta-
phors that he creates have an emotional similarity in their objects for 
that poet. However, this analysis of metaphor "places the phenomena of 
poetic thought and creation in their proper position in revealing their 
character as resulting from a natural trend of thought impregnated with 
emotion." (111:216) Rieser is making an attempt to relate the operation 
and process of forming a metaphor with the manner in which the human 
mind operates. In his ideas on the relationship between simile and 
metaphor Rieser agrees with the literalists, but his characterization of 
the resemblance between the subjects of the metaphor as emotional and 
not logical places him with the hon-literalists. 
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The second group of theorists, the non-literalists, have a gr>eater 
variety of views of metaphor, but the one factor that holds them to-
gether is their belief that metaphorical structure is not based on a 
literal similarity, but on the d:U'ference between the terms of a meta-
phor, and therefore the relationship between the tenns is not one of 
logical correspondence. According to the non-literalists, because this 
relationship is not logical and is absurd, a metaphor cannot be trans-
lat~d into a series of prose statements that will approach any kind of 
equivalence with the original metaphor. The metaphorical statement, 
"Achilles is a lion," is literally false: it does not fit with what we 
experience in our encounter with our environment. It is not logical in 
any sense that we understand logic. Logic has to do with a corres-
pondence between words on the designative level of notation, which is 
concerned with a general and public understanding, and not with words 
on the connotative or associative level, which are concerned with an 
individual and private understanding and are usually related to emo-
tional responses. 
Concerning similarity, the non-literalists say that, "It would be 
more illuminating in some of these cases to say that the metaphor 
creates the similarity than to say that it formulates some similarity 
antecedently existing." (16:37) A resemblance may antecedently exist, 
but it may also be created by the metaphor. In many cases, ''Metaphors 
can be supported by specially constructed systems of implications, as 
well as by accepted corrmonplaces; they can be made to measure and need 
not be reach-me-downs." (17:43) To admit a literal equivalent for 
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metaphor is to deny its uniqueness as a literary statement and its value 
as a means of achieving insight into problems and relationships. 
The non-literalists Max Black,, Monroe C. Beardsley,, William Empson,, 
and Bedell Stanford,, are all in general agreement. Basically,, they feel 
that a metaphor is a significant attribution that is either indirectly 
self-contradictory or obviously false in its context,, and in which the 
subsidiary subject connotes characteristics that can be attributed,, 
truly or falsely,, to the principal subject. A metaphorical statement is 
discourse that says more than it states,, by cancelling out the pr:lma.ry 
meaning to make room for secondary meanings. In poetry the chief tactic 
for obtaining this result is through the creation of logical absurdity. 
This absurdity is in the relationship between the two terms of the meta-
phor. Absurdity is the result of misapplied or transposed denotations,, 
designations and possibly some connotations. The logical absurdity of 
statements in poems forces them to meaning on the second level. 
Logically empty attributions are either ~elf-implicative or self-
contradictory. Whenever an attribution is indirectly self-contradictory,, 
but the subsidiary subject has designations or connotations that could 
be attributed to the principal subject,, the attribution is a metaphor-
ical attribution,, or a metaphor. 
This means that the emphasis for the non-literalists is not on any 
similarity or resemblance between the terms of a metaphor,, if there is 
any at all,, but on the differences between the terms. Through his 
choice the writer creates the metaphor in such a manner that he selects,, 
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emphasizes, suppresses, and organizes attributes of the principal sub-
ject by implying statements about it that normally apply to the sub-
sidiary subject. 
Black feels that a metaphor's principal and subsidiary subjects may 
best be thought of as "systems of things" rather than "things." That 
is, each subject must be considered in its total signification, which 
includes denotation, designation, connotation and associations. The 
juxtaposition of the principal subject with the subsidiary subject, as 
systems of things whether they be individual words or longer phrases, 
creates the metaphor by applying to the principal subject a system of 
"associated :tmplications" characteristic of the subsidiary subject. 
These associated implications usually consist of what Black calls 
"corrmonplaces" about the subsidiary subject, but may in suitable cases, 
consist of deviant implications established ad hoc by the writer. This 
means that the writer may make use of the com:nonly held denotations, 
designations and connotations or he may make use of his private associa-
tions to impose meaning. This process involves shifts of meaning of 
words belonging to the same family or system as the principal subject. 
Some of these shifts, though not all, may be metaphorical transfers. 
When, in "The Eye of Hurricane Renee," James Tate asks, "Today the 
clouds are I become vats of soda," he is using certain characteristics 
of vats and soda and applying these characteristics to the formation of 
clouds prior to the coming of a hurricane. We are to see the clouds as 
though they are vats of soda. But not all of the characteristics of 
vats of soda will be transferred to the clouds, only the ones that are 
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pertinent to the poem, only the characteristics that will imaginatively 
clarify and emphasize the characteristics of the clouds that he wants 
us to notice about the clouds on that day. 
Black's position is put forth concisely when he states, "The new 
context .•. :llrrposes extension of meaning upon the focal word. 11 (16:39) 
This is close to the view of I. A. Richards in that the reader must re-
main aware of the extension of meaning and must attend to both the old 
and the new meanings together. 
The idea of "extension of meaning" is used by Philip Wheelwright 
in his etymological approach to metaphor, in which he provides us with 
two new terms. Basically meta means "change" and phor means "movement." 
From this analysis we can see that a metaphor is a change in movement or 
direction. It is "a word transference from one universe of discourse 
to another," (133:433) or the intentional transfer of a name from one 
referent to another. The type of metaphor that creates new meaning 
through a basic similarity or relatedness is called epiphor by Wheel-
wright. ~can be translated as "over on to" and epiphor is then an 
outreach or extension of meaning through comparison. It is an effort 
to make each word mean more than it actually says. This type of meta-
phor would fit with the literalist theories. It is basically a simile 
without the words like or as. An exarrple of this type of metaphor is 
taken from Richard Wilbur's "Exeunt." 
All cries are thin and terse; 
The field has droned the surrnner's final mass; 
A cricket like a dwindling hearse 
Crawls from the dry grass. 
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There are many words that are related or s:imilar here and I won't try a 
complete explication but s:imilarities may be seen between cries and 
cricket, thin and blades of grass, droned and hearse, and summer and ~· 
For his other term Wheelwright adopts the root dia, which means 
"through," and creates the term diaphor; a creation of meaning by 
juxtaposition or synthesis. The "movement is 'through' certain par-
ticulars of experience." (143:78) This is a creation of meaning through 
the juxtaposition of diss:imilarities or unrelatedness. It emphasizes 
the differences between the terms. Here Wheelwright uses as an example 
two lines from Ezra Pound's "In a Station of the Metro." 
The apparition of these faces in the crowd; 
Petals on a wet, black bough. 
There is no relationship between the two lines or any of the words in 
these lines. We derive meaning from these lines because of, not in 
spite of, the unrelatedness of the lines. Because of the absurdity of 
the juxtaposition a new awareness of each situation is created. The 
term "diaphor" seems to be in agreement with the non-literalists' view 
of metaphor. According to Wheelwright both epiphor and diaphor may be 
present in one poem. Each stanza may be epiphoric while the relation-
ship between the stanzas may be diaphoric, or it may be the other Wa:;J 
around, or the character of the metaphor may change as we move through 
the poem. 
Douglas Berggren uses Wheelwright's idea of plurisignation, which 
is similar to Black's idea that meanings in metaphor may be accomplished 
on more than one level at a time, and he states that, "Vital metaphor 
should be defined as a plurisignificative sign focus where referents 
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can be univocally conjoined or fused only at the expense of absurdity, 
but which :implicitly involves a process of assimilative construing 
whose cognitive import cannot be entirely resolved into literal or non-
tensional assertions." (9:244) He claims.that given this theory we can 
say that the metaphor both creates and reveals. Berggren constructs a 
diagram which helps explain his view of the functioning of metaphor. 
F 
s-!- P 
I 
T 
F = Sign Focus 
S = Subsidiary Subject 
P = Principal Subject 
T = Transformed ass:imulation of S & F 
In this diagram, T, the transformed ass:imulation of S and P, is the 
completed metaphor. In connection with this diagram he states that 
"the legitimate and vital use of metaphor, while transforming S and P 
in the direction of T, by means of some principle of assimilative con-
struing, simultaneously retains their initial separation." (9:247) 
Berggren goes on to explain that given such a process of metaphorical 
construing, poetic textures appear. However, to-apprehend those tex-
tures we must construe the world with feeling and "nothing short of 
ultimately irreducible metaphor can open up or sustain this specific 
dimension of textural reality, or the poetic truth it affords." 
(9:256-257) Berggren would obviously disagree with the literalist 
position, for to him the very basis of metaphor and poetic textures 
lies in the absurdity of the metaphorical statement and in its inabil-
ity to be resolved into a series of literal equivalents. 
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Another non-literalist, Marcus Hester, presents us with the most 
detailed analysis of metaphor now available. He begins his analysis of 
metaphor by accepting the ideas of explicit and 1mplicit metaphor. An 
explicit metaphor, or simile, is one that uses the terms like or as. 
An 1mplicit metaphor does not use like or as, and is recognized by its 
being literally false. We must go outside the metaphor to be able to 
recognize an implicit metaphor. It is a tension between what is being 
said and our body of lmowledge. Accordingly, the terms of the metaphor 
do not establish a relationship through their similarity, as the 
literalists maintain, but renain unrelated because of their difference. 
The relationship is absurd in that we a.re not initially aware of any 
meaningful correspondence between the terms and therefore the completed 
metaphor is non-translatable. 
Thus Hester begins his analysis at the point where the other theor-
is ts finished theirs; that is, with the acceptance of metaphor as pre-
senting two terms that a.re not similar or related in the structural re-
lationship of a completed metaphor. In other words, the metaphor places 
two terms together that a.re not otherwise related. In being unrelated, 
the combination of the terms in the form of the completed metaphor is 
not a logical relationship, but an absurd one and as such is non-
translatable. 
The problem now is that if we accept these three conditions, i.e. 
the essential difference in the terms, the absurdity of the relationship 
and the non-translatability of the completed metaphor, how a.re we able 
to derive meaning from a metaphor? 
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In his effort to understand metaphor, Hester feels that we must 
approach it with an open mind and in a methodical manner. He uses as a 
base for his approach Husserl's "epoch," a method of bracketing out all 
limiting objects, attitudes and/or systems while concentrating one's 
attention on a single phenomenon. This means that we do not approach 
the phenomenon we are examining with any presuppositions concerning its 
nature. In this way, "The epoch allows 'the original right of all 
data ... '" (53:119) The use of the epoch is especially fitting, for 
"The reading which is appropriate to metaphor is that reading which 
allows the 'original right of all data' presented !2l_metaphor during 
the act of reading." (53:119) This reading allows us to approach the 
metaphor openly. In relating the two terms of a metaphor, the non-
literalists agree that we are transferring the terms of one category to 
the idioms of another; we are seeing one thing as if it were something 
else. For Hester this seeing as is perhaps the most important aspect 
of our understanding metaphor. Seeing as, to f'unction properly, re-
quires the principal and subsidiary subjects to be essentially differ-
ent, for if the principal and subsidiary subjects are similar, there is 
no new information imposed on either term by seeing them as they appear 
through the other term. If they are similar, the terms are inter-
changeable and we might as well only have one term. So it is through 
the juxtaposition of different terms that we can see one term in the 
light of the other. With this in mind Hester now says that, "Reading 
appropriate to poetic metaphor is reading which allows metaphor's 
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pr:ima.ry qualities, the words, and its secondary qualities, the imagery 
and seeing as, on an equal footing." (53:119) 
We can now see that the act of reading is neutral just as the 
aesthetic stance is neutral. Both the act of reading and the aesthetic 
stance lack positionality or belief content. The act of reading 
brackets out presuppositions concerning the physical world and systems 
of reality. In reading we do not divide the poem into real and ideal 
or primary and secondary qualities. Reading then, "is .§:.radical open-
ness which seeks as a methodological ideal to let the poem reveal its 
intention or meaning. Reading is an active openness to the text." 
(53:131) This then allows the poem to develop a sensuous fullness 
approaching that of a perceived object. However, the metaphors within 
a poem function through image control. That is, the images of a poem 
or metaphor are not free to be interpreted any w~ a person wants to 
interpret them. One w~ a poet controls his imagery is by exploiting 
"the aura of imagery which words get by association in our memory of 
that word with images of its referent." (53:143) Another way is through 
the use of etymological rejuvenation. Also, our history, that is of the 
world, associates certain words and types of language and selected 
imagery. 
The poet's intention or style selects certain imagery in the act of 
imposing his will on the medium and in this way rules against the acci-
dental. Thus, "imagery is part of the intentional structure or style 
of the metaphor. The metaphor as a stylized object is definitive of 
intention." (53:149) The concept of intention will be covered in the 
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next chapter. For now, just keep in mind that metaphors are deliberate-
ly--that is, intentionally--constructed. Lastly, the process of seeing 
as selects out the relevant aspects of metaphorical images. Hester 
(53:160) continues then by saying that, 
By metaphorical imagery then I understand those quasi-
sensuous experiences, occurring while reading metaphor, 
experiences which are qualitatively different from im-
pressions because their object is neither posited as 
existing nor not existing and because such imagery lacks 
the perspectival fullness of impressions. Further this 
quasi-sensuous experience is precisely a quasi-sensuous 
experience. We can and do speak of such imagery in 
qualitative terms. 
Thus far, then, we can say that in reading metaphor, images occur, 
these images are not free, the images are quasi-sensuous experiences 
and these :1ma.ges are contemplated as ends in themselves which do not 
necessarily correspond with either the physical world or "reality." 
Imagery and seeing as are related to each other because metaphor 
"involves the intuitive relation of seeing as between parts of the 
description." (53:169) That is, there is a positive relation of seeing 
as between the principal and subsidiary subjects. The seeing as 
identifies the subsidiary subject as different from the principal sub-
ject. Essentially then, "metaphorical seeing as is ~seeing as between 
elements of an imagistic description." (53:176) Thus, "Seeing as is an 
intuitive experience-act !2l. which one selects from the quasi-sensory 
mass of imagery one has on reading metaphor the relevant aspects of 
such imagery." (53:180) Seeing as is an intuitive experience-act and 
as such is irreducible. It is not possible to reduce it to a set of 
rules or to a series of prose equivalents as the literalists would like 
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to do. Hester concludes by saying that, "seeing as is the fundamental 
distinguishing characteristic of metaphor in poetry." (53:175-176) And, 
"metaphor is ~ fusion of sense and serisa because the seeing as in the 
metaphorical structure is half thought, h.q.lf experienced," therefore, 
"in reading metaphor one experiences ~~and sottnd-sensa-related in~ 
relevant way - sense." (53:187-188) 
Hester has attempted to show that the differences between the terms 
of a metaphor are more important than the similarities, the juxtaposi-
tion of two terms that are essentially different create an illogical or 
absurd relationship, at least on the denotative and designative levels, 
and because it is an illogical or absurd relationship the metaphor is 
non-translatable. 
Basically the images we have or derive from words are private and 
are thus not justifiable reference criteria. That is, our images 
probably will not provide meanings for other people. This is to imply 
that meaning is not an inner image nor an inner verbal translation. 
The only generalization about meaning that we can make is 
the very limited one: 'For a large class of cases - though 
not for all - in which we employ the word 'meaning' it can 
be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the 
language. (53:51) 
There are several senses of the word use. It may be thought of in an 
individual sense, an instrumental sense, and a social sense. The social 
sense of the word use can be thought of as involving public actions; -- ' 
meaning as an act, both verbal and behavioral, and involving public 
objects--that is, it presupposes public acts and public objects, a 
cormnon physical environment, and involving a body of accepted conventions. 
23 
These conventions form the standard use.of the language. The instru-
mental sense of use would be pr:iJna.rily.concerned with the denotative, 
designative and connotative values of words.but not with the associa-
tive value of words. The individual sense of use would be concerned 
with total signification encompassing denotation, designation, connota-
tion and association. Poetry means on all these levels for it may be 
interpreted as being used on all these levels. 
The way use is described means that denotative language is general, 
and public and associative language is individual and private. This is 
why the images we derive from words, which are primarily associative, 
probably do not provide adequate meanings for other people. These 
images are private and are not necessarily understood by other people. 
Therefore, the way the language is used determines its meaning in a 
large number of cases and it is the way language is a.rTanged into a 
metaphor that establishes metaphor as a means of creating insight and 
language growth. The most important method of creating insight through 
the use of metaphor is to establish the metaphor as a presentational 
symbol, an icon and a concrete universal, all of these terms being more 
or less interchangeable. Hester accepts Langer's argument for the 
poem as a presentational symbol in as much as it is a direct presenta-
tion of an individual object. Ogden and Richards also agree with 
Langer that the poem is a presentation of an experience; that is, in 
reading a poem one has an experience. 
If we accept that standard language is referential and poetic 
language is presentational, then poetic language is also iconic. An 
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icon shares certain qualities with its object, just as a picture shares 
certain qualities with the pictured object. Iconicity and signification 
are also inversely related. Thus there is a similarity in the terms 
presentational symbol and icon. 
W:irnsatt argues "that what distinguishes poetry from scientific or 
logical discourse is a degree of irrelevant concreteness in descriptive 
details." (53:72) Now, particulars in themselves do not mean; they must 
be related to something beyond themselves. And this something else is 
the universal. This is accomplished by expressing the reality of the 
inter-action between the I who is aware and the that of which I am 
aware. And accordingly, "the coalescence of the self and the not self 
involves a second coalescence between the particular and universal." 
(53,:75) Thus we can sey that the poem is also a concrete universal. 
Combining these elements, Hester (53:79) seys that, 
The logical and counterlogical elements in the poem function 
to make the poem an icon. Iconic language is 'thick' and pre-
sents its object in a manner similar to a painting's presenta-
tion of its object. This means that iconic language, the 
thick language of the poem, is not transparent. Like a paint-
ing it is looked at and not through. The poem has become 
'thingy.' As such, it forces us to recognize that it is re-
lated to reality in the same wey in which a sculptured object 
is related to reality, that is, metaphorically. (53:79) 
This is to sey that, "the poem is a picture (noun), but it does not 
picture (verb) literally or correspond. ·The poem is a concrete object 
not a transparent :image." (53:80) The poem as an icon and a concrete 
object is using language in a way that it is not nornially used. In stan-
dard language the denotative and designative values are emphasized and 
we look through the words to their referents and critical attributes. 
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In poetic language the total signification is emphasized and we look at 
the words and their interrelationships. 
The qualities of the language that the poet works with are the 
sense of the language, the sound of the language, and imagery. These 
are the qualities of language as a medium. The sense is the total sig-
nification of each word or phrase including the denotation, designation, 
connotation and associations of each word or phrase, while the sensa is 
described by Hester as the sound and imagery taken together. Therefore 
in combination with what has been said earlier, Hester now says, 
"Poetic language is that language in which both sense and sound function 
iconically, thus yielding.§:_ fusion of sense and sensa." (53:96) In this 
manner, "poetic language attains the concreteness of an icon." (53:96) 
This is not the case with standard language. Standard language and 
poetic language are not unrelated to each other; they are at opposite 
ends of a continuous scale. 
The juxtaposition of principal and subsidiary subjects essentially 
different and unrelated creates the absurdity of metaphor and makes it 
non-translatable. These conditions also establish metaphor as iconic 
use of language. Iconic use of language creates a situation in which 
we look at language and not through it. It draws attention to itself 
as being used differently from the way in which language is normally 
used. Iconic use is therefore a method of foregrounding language. 
Foregrounding is always in relation to standard use of language and it 
is at this point that metaphorical theory and general language theory 
merge. I will develop the concept of foregrounding and a general theory 
in the next chapter. 
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Hester's explanation of non-literal metaphor is the most explicit 
single explanation we now have. He has established that metaphor is 
canposed of principal and subsidiary subjects that are essentially dif-
ferent; this difference is expressive of an absurd relationship between 
the terms and because of this the metaphor is non-translatable. His 
anphasis on the iconic nature of metaphor leads us up to the point of 
relating metaphor to a theory of language. However Hester has just 
led us up to that point. He has formed the basic ground work and now 
we will attempt to formulate a theory of language and integrate that 
with a theory of non-literal metaphors consistent with what we have 
said so far. Both of these theories must also fit with the manner in 
which man encounters his universe and acquires knowledge. 
CH.APTER III 
A Philosophy of Metaphor 
Accepting that metaphor is composed of two parts that are related 
to one another, we will agree with Black and call these parts the 
'principal' subject and the 'subsidiary' subject. These subjects can 
be of the simplest nature possible like the specific concrete term, 
rock, or they may be a complex system of things like a philosophical 
attitude. In order to create a metaphor we must apply the system of 
'associated implications' that normally apply to the subsisiary subject 
and are characteristic of it to the principal subject. The associated 
implications will include the designative, connotative and associative 
values of words which, taken together with the denotation, constitute 
the signification of each term. If there is a physical resemblance be-
tween the two subjects, it is purely coincidental because the resemb-
lance necessary, if any, is one of a complex of emotions. The transfer 
of 'associated implications' from the subsidiary subject to the prin-
cipal subject is similar to Turbayne's "the presentation of the facts 
of one category in the idioms appropriate to another." (132:12) He 
calls this transfer "sort-crossing" because there seems to be a certain 
inappropriateness of terms being placed together in a metaphor. This 
inappropriateness results from the use of a sign in a sense different 
from what we normally expect. In a metaphor we have two different 
levels of sense or understanding and we must simultaneously be aware 
of this duality of sense and pretend that the two different senses are 
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one. There is a constant shift or change.of our focus from one term 
and sense level to the other term and sense level, such as we have in 
Op art, except Op art is only on.the.visual level. Turbayne quotes 
Gilbert Ryle as saying of metaphor that, "It represents the facts •.. 
as if they belonged to one logical type or category (or range of types 
of categories), when they actually belong to another." (132:17) I will 
go into the term "as if" later for it is an important consideration in 
understanding metaphor. 
Aldrich claims that in viewing a metaphor "you see an·:ynage in the 
medium of the picture, or the picture a.rllrnated by the :image." (1:57) 
He calls this mode of perception "prehension" and distinguishes it from 
"observation." In other words, "One 'observes' that Xis P, but one 
'prehends' X as Y, where Xis not Y, and Y is an aspect of X a.rllrnating 
it." (1:57) The artist's manipulation "is for the sake of the beholders 
seeing the composition as something that it is not. The image of this 
something 'a.rllrnates' the work, which thus expressively portrays the 
artist's impression--brings it to the prehensive view of the beholder." 
(96:65) 
Thus far, then, we have established that there are two terms re-
lated in some way 1n a metaphor. The relationship between these terms 
emphasizes their difference; that is, the relationship is basically 
absurd, and the completed metaphor is a non-translatable presentation. 
All of these points are part of a non-literal theory of metaphor. 
Accepting the portions of the theories that I have indicated, we 
now have established the component parts of a metaphor, and what a 
metaphor does, but the various theorists have not been able to explain 
how we are able to combine the terms of a .metaphor. This is the one 
place where all . of the theories are lacking. Max Black describes the 
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process as involving "shifts of meaning"; Turbayne uses the term "sort-
crossing" as seeing one thing as if it were something else; Aldrich 
accomplishes the transference through "prehension"; Berggren uses some 
"principal of assimilative construing" and Hester describes 11seeing as" 
as in "intuitive experience-act." All.of these terms are referring to 
the same basic process. The need at this point is·to describe what it is 
that enables us to accomplish what the terms mentioned above allow us to 
do. How are we able to relate the two terms of the metaphor? 
All of these descriptions require that the reader participate in 
the metaphor to the extent of combining the terms of the metaphor in 
some wey. This combining of the terms is an act of subjective synthesis 
on the part of the reader. The question now is how do we accomplish this 
act of subjective synthesis? The basis for performing the act of sub-
jective synthesis lies in Husserl's concept of the transcendental ego. 
The transcendental ego is the ultimate source or basis for the 
nature of subjectivity. The transcendental ego is not the psychological 
or empirical ego. The empirical ego is merely one item of empirical 
presentations before me. The totality of experience that I have will be 
called the transcendental realm. The transcendental realm or conscious-
ness is usually what is ref erred to when one speaks of his body or his 
"person." Behind this lies the transcendental ego. The transcendental 
ego is the source of all intentionality. The transcendental ego is pure 
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consciousness, one of whose objects is the person that I am. The 
epistemological problem, that is the problem of an external world, is 
really a language problem because there is no external aspect to the 
ego. Interpersonal or intersubjective relationships are characterized 
by intentionality. 
The relationship between the metaphor and the reader is one of 
intersubjectivity. That is, the metaphor was written by a specific 
person with a specific meaning to attain that was constructed from a 
subjective standpoint. This relationship, as all intersubjective rela-
tionships, may be characterized by intentionality. By intentionality 
Husserl means that in order to perform an act we must intend to do so. 
However, intentionality is rarely conscious, it is automatic, passive, 
unconscious and anonymous. 
It is from our basic intentionality that we perform the act of 
subject synthesis through application of the phenomenological epoch 
which brackets out all limiting attitudes and systems in order to be 
open to that which we want to investigate. This method consists in 
focusing on any part or all of a particular experience by removing our-
selves from the immediate and lived engagement in it. In the aesthetic 
experience all but the subject itself is bracketed; the subject is 
extracted from the stream of practical, involved, committed, and en-
gaged concerns in order that it may be contemplated, described and 
analyzed in isolation without the limitations of philosophical or any 
other presuppositions. This method can be applied to metaphor. Through 
the use of the epoch we bracket out the presuppositions so that all we 
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are confronted with is the metaphor itself and the relationship between 
the two parts of the metaphor. 
After being open to accept each terrn of the metaphor in its full-
est sense an:1 on its own ground without any presuppositions, we must be 
able to meet the synthesized metaphor on its own ground ar.d without any 
presuppositions carried over from the limits of previously held systems. 
When this is done, the metaphor seems new, a fresh insight because we 
have not previously been in the position that we find ourselves a~er 
reading and assimilating the synthesized metaphor. 
The data for examination through the use of the phenomenological 
epoch need not be only sensory, it can also be eidetic or effective; 
that is, it can be a concept to the extent that it is apprehended as a 
subject for examination. In the same way an emotion, my own first per-
son apprehension of an emotion, may be thought of as a subject to which 
I can apply the epoch and its bracketing. A perception of a metaphor, 
even if it is continuous and unchanging, is a composite in that it is 
made up of time intervals; two appearances may be similar in all res-
pects as the two elements of a metaphor, but the fact that they are 
apprehended at different times means their unity is also a matter of 
subjective decision, constitution and intention, not of pure giveness. 
To describe both of the appearances that occur at different intervals 
in time, like the two terms of a metaphor, to one ar.d the same object 
is an act of subjective synthesis. The two terms of a metaphor are 
each considered as subjects and in considering these subjects, we must 
include the total signification of each subject. The total signification 
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would include its denotative, designative, connotative and associative 
values. That is, we must not only consider the objective referents of 
that term but also our subjective referents to that term. 
The combination of past, present and future is synthesized into one 
intended construct which comprises each term of the metaphor as a sub-
ject. The completed metaphor, the two subjects taken together, is also 
viewed in relationship to its past, present and future. That is, its 
past meanings and associations that we have about it, what it means at 
the present, and what our expectations are of it in the future. 
Thus it is through our intentionality that we can perform the act 
of subjective synthesis that the non-literal theorists were alluding to 
and unable to describe. The subjective synthesis applies not only to 
the two subjects (terms) of the metaphor in relationship to each other, 
but also to the past, present and future of the completed metaphor. The 
completed metaphor may be thought of as a complex subject structure that 
is a result of synthesization. However, on a more sophisticated level 
Husserl recognizes that subjective synthesis and access to bther minds 
is achieved through empathy which is a part of our intentionality. The 
reduction of psychological space through intentionality and empathy is a 
central feature of the manner in which other minds appear to me. Inter-
personal or intersubjective relationships are characterized by inten-
tionality and empathy. (96:65) 
Empathy has been described by Professor Groos in this manner: 
"When the body feelings, etc., are.not perceived as localized in the 
body, they seem to fill the object (perceived*); when these sensations 
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are still too weak to induce our attentions to wander from the object, 
but are sufficiently strong to have a decided.effect on consciousness, 
there is a projection of ourselves in the.object; if they are still 
stronger, they will be definitely realized ... " (8:321) 
Lipps also feels that in empathizing with an object there is a 
projection of our ego into that object. The "projection" spoken of by 
Groos and Lipps, I interpret as being empathy itself and as such is an 
integral part of intentionality. Beardsley has said that in empathiz-
ing with an object we identify with the "forces through which its form 
has originated." (8:321) Therefore in empathizing with an object there 
is an intentional projection of ourselves, our subjectivity, into that 
object. This object has now become a subject and the relationship be-
tween it and myself is one of intersubjectivity. 
Max Rieser was approaching the idea of empathy when he said that 
the similarity in a metaphor was not between the signification of the 
terms of the metaphor but between the emotions created between the two 
terms of the metaphor. Douglass Berggren has said that in order to 
transform the subsidiary and principal subjects in the light of each 
other we must construe the world with feeling. Both of these people 
seem to be getting at empathy. Through empathy we come to know what is 
beyond our imnediate sense experience. To empathize, in a literary 
sense, is to participate in an interaction (the interaction between the 
two terms of the metaphor) between categories or universes of discourse 
and as a result of this participation to become aware of existences 
that are organically related to our present body of knowledge. Our 
basic grounding as intentional beings, with empathy as a part of that 
intentionality, enables us to transcend our mental limits at any one 
specific time; to realize" ... the alternations of that current which 
runs from subject to object and from object to subject," (8:318) and 
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the subjectivity of objects and the objectivity of subjects. It is the 
means by which we orient ourselves to the world, create meaning and 
derive a sense of identity. The ability to perform the needed synthesis 
of the terms of the metaphor, and then accept that synthesis and relate 
it to our present body of knowledge is, as explained earlier, rooted in 
the basic intentionality of our psychological make-up but is also, in 
its fullest sense, environmentally influenced. Thus the creation and 
understanding of metaphor has both a linguistic and a psychological basis. 
Since rretaphor is part of the total structure of language, a 
theory of metaphor must fit into and be a derivative of an overall 
theory of language. So far there has been no attempt to relate meta-
phorical theory and language theory. We will now attempt to formulate 
a theory of language and a non-literal theory of metaphor that will 
generally accorrmodate each other. In order to understand the unusual 
and unique expression, of which metaphor is one type, we need to know 
the usual or standard, or at least how the usual or standard is formed. 
We cannot go back to the beginning of language and see how it was 
originally formed, so we need to develop an hypothesis on how a corrmon 
or standard use of language develops. Language develops only through 
a use of unique words, ideas or expressions gradually becoming corrmon 
enough that they can be used by many people and these people can then 
relate these words, ideas or expressions to other people that will 
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understand what they mean. This means that the movement of language is 
from associative, individual and private .. expressions to designative, 
general and public expressions. That is, initially the word or ex.pres-
sion is unique to one person and only later through more and more people 
using that word or expression does it become common or standardized. 
The result of this process has been called "automatization" by Bohuslav 
Havranek. (48:9-10) He says that, 
By automatization we thus mean such a us~ of the devices of 
the language, in isolation or in combination with each other, 
as is usual for a certain expressive purpose, that is, such a 
use that the expression itself does not attract any attention; 
the communication occurs, and is received, as conventional in 
linguistic form and is to be 'understood' by virtue of the 
linguistic system without first being supplemented, in the 
concrete utterance, by additional understanding derived from 
the situation and the context. 
Thus we achieve a language that is basically denotative and desig-
native. The words and the syntactical structure of the language are 
understood by the users of that language without any additional explan-
ation required. The language at this point does not introduce any new 
words or syntactical structures. Its main purpose is to convey ideas 
already held in common by the users of that language as simply and as 
clearly as possible. 
Now an "automatized" language is language that is stabilized, but 
we need to allow for new forms, words or syntactical structures to enter 
the language which will in turn allow us to express and conmunicate new 
ideas. Without some process of deviating from the standard, language 
would be unable to cope with new and individualized expressions. 
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Havranek (48:10) has called one process of deviating from the standard 
automatized language "foregrounding." In contrast to automatization he 
says that, 
By f oregrouniing . . . we mean the use of the devices of the 
language in such a way that this use itself attracts atten-
tion and is perceived as uncommon, as deprived of automatiza-
tion, as de-automatized, such as a live poetic metaphor (as 
opposed to a lexicalized one, which is automatized). 
As a result of the automatization of language we have a body of 
words, granmatical and syntactical structures which Mukarovsky says 
"furthers the generality of modes of expression, that is, their inde-
pendence of the person of the speaker, as well as their formality, that 
is, their independence of the passing linguistic and extralinguistic 
situation, and of the concrete meaning." (96: 62) This automatized 
language, supports the communicative and intellectual function of 
language. In contrast with this, foregrounding serves, 
to counteract the automatization of the act of speech, to 
individualize it over and over again, with regard to both 
the personality of the speaker and the uniqueness of the 
linguistic and extralinguistic situation from which the act 
of speech sterns. (96:61) 
Thus the foregrounding helps establish and reaff1rm the relation-
ship between the individual and the standard linguistic pattern and the 
linguistic pattern and reality. It is one method that enables the 
speaker to constantly double-check and correct the relationships among 
himself, the standard language, his use of language, and reality. It 
maintains the functional forms of language by emphasizing the difference 
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between the standard and poetic language. In addition to this it also 
emphasizes uniqueness and non-repeatability in the use of language. 
The system which determines the standard automatized language is 
called the "parole." We all use language in accordance with the general 
parole, which determines our use of language with the confines of the 
standard automatized language. However, there is also our individual 
parole, which is linked to our individual personality and as such is 
linked to poetic language. 
Language can be said to have two basic functions, the communicat-
ive and the esthetic. Standard automatized language is linked pre-
dominantly with the comnunicative function. Foregrounding is linked 
predominantly with the esthetic function. 
Our concern ia primarily to establish the basis for poetry within 
the confines of a general language theory. Poetry is a functional 
dialect in which the esthetic function predominates. However, the 
esthetic function is less able to overshadow the communicative function 
of language than the communicative function is to overshadow the esthet-
ic, so the esthetic function is the most difficult to achieve or to 
make predominant. This may be because the foregrounded elements are 
new by being placed in a new perspective and in new relationships; they 
are part of the standard language but are not used in the standard way. 
We mainly see only what we are used to seeing and foregrounding presents 
us with a new emphasis, something we are not used to seeing by deviation 
from current standard usage. The dominance of the esthetic function in 
poetry has nothing to do with the raw number of foregrounded components. 
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In fact only a certain number of components can be foregrounded at one 
time. Simultaneous foregrounding of all components of language is im-
possible. But whether a component is foregrourded or not, in poetry all 
components are esthetically relevant. "The predominance of the esthet-
ic function in poetic language, by contrast with communicative speech, 
thus consists in the esthetic relevance of the utterance as a whole." 
(1:58) 
Being a structure, that is, an iniivisible whole, the work 
of poetry constitutes an esthetic value, a canplex phenom-
enon which is at the same time unique and regular. Its 
uniqueness is given by the indivisibility of its canposi-
tion, its regularity by the mutual equilibration of the re-
lations between the canponents; being unique the work of 
poetry is nonrepeatable and accidental; being regular, how-
ever, it lays claim to general and permanent recognition. 
(60:35) 
The uniqueness of poetry relates it to the deautanatized language 
and the permanence relates it to standard automatized language. It is 
in constant fluctuation between the unique and the pennanent; accident 
and law and its freedom from forms to adherence to norms. If the 
esthetic creation which forms deautanatized language accepts order it 
becomes automatized language and reaches over from the area of the 
momentary utterance to that of the conventions superordinate to the in-
dividual utterances which is the general parole. Poetic language has 
then moved from the individual and private to the general and public 
expression. 
Metaphor is one of the most basic and effective ways to achieve 
foregrourding. By presenting relationships both that we have not been 
presented with before ani in a new way, the metaphor draws our attention 
to itself and is.foregrounded. We see that it is a different way of 
using language than we are ordinarily used to. 
39 
From the basic established by Havranek and Mukarovsky we can see 
that metaphor could not be translated into a series of prose statements 
but could and would be assimilated into the structured esthetic and 
standard language in the process of automatization. It also could not 
be translated into a series of prose statements because of its basically 
illogical construction. There is no system available into which we 
could reliably transfer its meaning. By being foregrounded, metaphor 
emphasizes uniqueness and non-repeatability. When metaphors become 
automatized, they form dead (hidden) metaphors and later become cliches 
and even later, part of the standard language. The process of auto-
matization is a primary method by which we gain new words and ideas, 
and therefore expand our language and knowledge. And this process is 
dependent on foregrounding and the creation of new metaphors to have a 
word or phrase that can be automatized. Thus the general theory of 
language put forth would support a non-literal theory of metaphor. 
A new metaphor, created by foregrounding certain aspects of real-
ity within the language, whether actual physical occurrences or mental 
attitudes, may be gradually understood by a body of the users of that 
language and become automatized into dead metaphors, cliches and even-
tually become part of the standard language. If it is automatized and 
transferred into the standard language, this also means that it has 
moved from individual parole to the general parole. Thus metaphor is 
unique expression but unique expression that may, if the expression is 
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simple enough, be able to become part.of the standard automatized lan-
guage. However, .if the metaphor is .complex either in structure of idea, 
it is likely to remain alive as a metaphor, an inherent part of an indi-
vidual parole. The greatest poets are those who create metaphors that 
can be understood by a large number of .people but due to the complexity 
either of the structure or idea of the completed metaphor they remain 
live poetic metaphors. Winifred Nowottny feels that certain words, 
"may serve as escape-hatches from conceptual terms, because of their 
power to refer us out of language to an object ..• which in real life 
is a visible crisis-point or declaration-point in a complicated history 
of process, a natural symbol with all the advantages over language of 
being in itself a simultaneity of opposites." (99:86) When these words 
are combined in the form of a metaphor, we are at the point of creating 
our own reality. For, "metaphor shakes our bearings on the question of 
how we stand in relation to 'objective reality,' and a metaphor inside 
a metaphor unfixes those bearings altogether; it makes us lose our dir-
ection--fix on the position of what is 'out there' in 'reality' and the 
position of our own consciousness of that." (99:84-85) 
If we have a metaphor metaphorized (with each term of the metaphor 
a metaphor itself) we create a double jump outside the convention. In 
this way a complete poem can form a single co!Ii)lex metaphor of which 
its terms would be other metaphors. This breaks the hold the convention 
has on all of us and enables us to become aware of the subjectivity of 
objects and objectivity of the subjective process. Nowottny feels that 
this is so because, "The paradoxical or irrational features of poetic 
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language are a means of shortcircuiting the detour of consciousness 
through the polarized concepts of normal language--or perhaps we should 
rather SB:J that they are a means .of revealing the alternations of that 
current which . ru:ru:; from subject to .. object and from object to subject." 
(99:86) Metaphor in Nowottny's terms is far more than just a decorative 
or even explanatory (in the simple sense) device. It is the means by 
which we orient ourselves to the world, create meaning, and derive a 
sense of identity. 
Achieving insight through the understanding of a metaphor is not 
a process of losing one's subjectivity, ego, or selfhood, but is the 
uniting of that subjectivity, ego, or selfhood with what was thought to 
be, without insight, an external object. It is an imaginative advance-
ment to the realization that what was thought to be external to our-
selves is now part of ourselves. Thus it is a dissolving of the subject-
object dichotomy and a unification and fulfilling of ourselves with our 
environment. It increases not only our understanding of the interrela-
tionships of what we perceive as real but also enlarges our concept of 
reality. 
*Books and articles 
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